As drone and missile strikes continue between the U.S. and Iran, Washington's negotiating position appears to be hardening rather than softening toward a resolution. Conversations at the 10th annual Atlantic Council Global Energy Forum revealed minimal discussion of American concessions or Iranian capitulation, particularly regarding the Strait of Hormuz. The current $90s-and-below WTI price environment appears to be providing the White House increased confidence to pursue more maximalist objectives, thereby extending the conflict timeline. The pattern of escalation has intensified: the U.S. recently conducted strikes on Iranian military facilities following the downing of a U.S. Apache helicopter in the Persian Gulf by an Iranian drone, Iran responded by firing on U.S. bases in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Jordan, and the U.S. launched another round of strikes.
Both the Trump administration officials and regional leaders from the Gulf were adamant that Iran would not exercise any control rights over the Strait of Hormuz at the conclusion of the conflict or receive compensation for allowing transit through the waterway. This raises a fundamental question about the type of measures Washington and its regional allies are willing to take to ensure full reopening of the critical waterway.
U.S. air support is reportedly enabling an increased number of ships to traverse the waterway, potentially in the 6-to-15 range, over and above the handful of vessels paying Tehran to secure safe passage through the Iranian channel. While this may represent a meaningful increase above the low baseline since the start of the war, it remains drastically below pre-conflict levels and is largely one-directional. The increased reliance on U.S. air escorts raises a clear confrontation risk, as evidenced by the downing of the U.S. helicopter on June 9th. While the Apache attack came perilously close to crossing President Trump's declared redline for full resumption of fighting, it has not significantly moved the needle on oil prices at the time of writing, with WTI hovering around $90/bbl.
"If the White House is indeed intent on eradicating the IRGC's grip on the Strait of Hormuz, it would seemingly entail a deeper U.S. military engagement."
Helima Croft, Head of Global Commodity Strategy and MENA Research, RBC Capital Markets
If the White House is intent on eradicating the IRGC's grip on the Strait of Hormuz through the negotiating table, current signals suggest that outcome remains unlikely. Iran appears unwilling to relinquish its control of the Strait, which is arguably more important than the nuclear program for restoring a measure of regional deterrence. Beyond securing the Strait, there seems to be an additional ask from regional partners for enhanced U.S. air defense to secure the above-ground pipeline pumping stations and export facilities for both existing Hormuz bypass routes and ones being planned.
The ultimate price for securing Middle East energy flows may necessitate an enhanced version of the 1980s U.S. Carter Doctrine, which declared that securing Persian Gulf energy flows was a core national security priority. That doctrine, which helped ensure the sanctity of the petrodollar, came to a de facto end in September 2019 when the U.S. failed to respond to the Iranian attack on Saudi Arabia's Abqaiq facility. At the time, the White House insisted that abundant American energy production rendered the doctrine unnecessary, a byproduct of the bygone era of American energy dependence. Much of the discussion to date has focused on the looming post-war infrastructure build-out as countries race to find Hormuz workarounds. However, there has been less discussion about the ultimate U.S. defense posture that may be required to secure this infrastructure in the absence of full regime capitulation or change in Tehran.
Washington's negotiating position may shift if there is another significant run-up in prices or the emergence of visible shortages in key markets. Considerable discussion at the Forum focused on the impact of reaching operational minimums for strategic and commercial storage, with some suggesting that 300 mb in the SPR may represent a hard functional floor before the onset of infrastructure damage. Yet even with the visible inventory race to the bottom, the muted oil price (currently standing around $15/bbl below levels on the eve of the ceasefire) appears to be creating a marked urgency deficit in Washington to bring the conflict to an immediate conclusion.
Helima Croft authored "Post Card from DC: Urgency Deficit," published on June 10, 2026. For more information on the full report, please contact your RBC representative.
