Dumpster fire | Transcript

Published | 20 min read

Speaker 1:

Hello, and welcome to Macro Minutes. During each episode, we will be joined by RBC Capital Markets experts to provide high-conviction insights on the latest developments in financial markets and the global economy. Please listen to the end of this recording for important disclosures.

Jason Daw:

Hello, everyone, and welcome to this edition of Macro Minutes called "Dumpster Fire." I'm Jason Daw, your host for today's call, which we're recording at 10:00 a.m. Eastern Time on September the 29th. Now, bond yields, they've spiked globally. This has been led by an interrelated combination of oil prices and repricing of central bank terminal rates. Momentum and investors exiting their long exposure has definitely added fuel to the fire. And to put this into context, the one-month increase in the two-year yield in the US over the past month, it's one of the largest we've seen in the past 25 years. This has subsequently pushed up long-term interest rates and flattened the yield curve. And these dynamics have not been isolated just to the US market. It is a phenomenon that's happening globally. And for now, risk assets, such as equities and credit, they have been quite well-behaved. But as history shows, when rates rise sharply and that's accompanied by an exogenous shock like oil, for example, that small cracks in macro or markets can turn into problems. So, it's something to keep an eye on going forward.

And in today's episode, I am joined by Peter Schaffrik, our Head of UK and Europe Rates and Macro, and Blake Gwinn, our Head of US Rates Strategy. And what we're going to try to do is address the dumpster fire that's happening in the global rates market: what's driving it, if it's sustainable, and if central banks will over or underdeliver versus what's priced in.

So, we're going to kick it off discussing the US Treasury market and the Fed, because obviously that's the tail that wags the dog for the global bond market. And we're going to start with the Fed, where the market's pricing four more hikes over the cycle. And Blake, can you tell our listeners what your call is on the Fed and the risks around your modal outlook?

Blake Gwinn:

Yeah, sure. So, right now, we're still looking at this, at least for now, we're looking at this as a removal of last year's insurance cuts. So, if you recall, the Fed cut three times last year to protect against a more significant rollover in the labor market, and that labor market decline never really materialized. So, I think it's very easy for them to kind of take back those cuts. So we're looking for a series of three, including what we did in September, with those next two coming in October and December. I don't really see any reason to skip October. Nothing's really changed from the September FOMC, if you think about it. And for anybody kind of pushing back on the political side of this, I think midterms is a bit of a red herring in terms of the Fed reaction function. I really just don't think that the election cycle is really playing into their view as much as people outside tend to think it is.

After we get through December, look, there's a lot of uncertainty in the outlook. We don't ultimately have anything penciled in. We think the Fed's going to take a pause and kind of sit there for a while unless inflation's more clearly re-accelerating, rather than what we're seeing now, which is just not really improving as fast as they would like. But a lot of that is going to depend on the Iran outcome. We don't have a high conviction call on that at this point; I don't think anybody really can. But the longer that does go on, I think the Fed has to worry a little bit more about the probability that it starts spilling over more into core inflation measures and really going to become more problematic for broader inflation. So, the longer that does go on, that assumption of a hold in 2027 would probably become challenged.

Jason Daw:

Thanks, Blake. And what about further out the curve, 10-year, 30-year bond yields? They've spiked also to multi-decade highs. What's driving that in your opinion, and can "the house", aka the Treasury Department, do anything to stop it?

Blake Gwinn:

Yeah, I mean, look, this move, all the way back to March, for me, it's really just about the realignment of global central bank expectations, where we went from having a dovish bias to now pricing in a pretty sharp course of hikes in the US, but across all major regions, really. And I think protection against even more than that. If you look at just kind of the central, the modal pricing, if you will, or the risk-adjusted pricing that we see in the market, you're also seeing a lot of tail risk being covered in US rate space. So, I think those concerns about much higher rates, that's really what this selloff has been about. I think also oil prices, which is tied into that entire theme. We've seen a very high correlation between the long end and oil prices. So, I think that's really what's been driving this broader move.

Now, if you look at the last week, and I think, Jason, your title of the podcast "Dumpster Fire", I mean, if I'm kind of thinking about the last week's moves, you really layered on some positioning pain. But if I could kind of stick with that metaphor, I'd say the US has been more kind of warming our hands by that dumpster fire than actually in the dumpster. You've had a lot of stops. We've got Peter on who's going to talk more about that on the European side. But I think it has been more of a European story where we've been getting, US has been kind of getting dragged along with that. It just hasn't really seemed that disorderly. I don't think we've seen the same level of kind of stop-outs that they've had in Europe in the US. If you look at places like swap spreads or other places where you might expect signs of bigger positioning washouts or de-risking by US rates investors, we just haven't seen it that much. I think the mood's been kind of surprisingly calm on the US side despite the degree to which we've actually seen duration moving higher.

So, you ask about Treasury stopping the move. I think Bessent's got a couple of potential levers he could still pull at this point. But with the mood around global rates, amid this move, I'm just not sure they would be anything more than a tiny, short-lived Band-Aid. You asked specifically about Treasury, but I do think, to really see a meaningful retracement of this yield move, you're going to have to see a resolution in Iran or some kind of large risk-off in equities or which would probably come from some pressure on the AI trade. But those don't really seem like anything that's that likely in the near term. I mean, those seem like stories that are months off at this point, not something in the coming weeks. So, overall, I think it's been very easy to sell off, but I really think there's a bit of asymmetry in trying to rally back. I mentioned that correlation with oil, but we've already seen the correlation to increases in oil prices and rates has been a lot higher than when we see oil prices decline, rates haven't really followed quite as strongly. So, even if we see oil come off a little bit, even if we get a softer patch in the data, I just think there's this asymmetry in how easy it is to keep selling off versus how easy it is to rally back and really see a meaningful retracement.

Jason Daw:

Okay, great. So, the last set of questions, that I have on the US side: there's been over time, these flare-ups or narratives that have developed where people kind of pin rising yields on deficits and debt. And I guess, where do you land on that as the first part? And the second part, and even from a bigger picture standpoint, what's your opinion on what rate hikes would do to the economy if the Fed did a couple more from here, or even a little bit more than what you're expecting?

Blake Gwinn:

Yeah, look, I think fiscal deficits and bond vigilantes, they're very flashy stories to talk about. I think what typically happens, when we see yields selling off for other reasons, it tends to kind of embolden the fiscal hawks to come out and start getting very loud. But I just don't think it's really consistent with what we're seeing in the price action. If you look at long-end spreads, which is somewhere you would expect to see a lot of pain if there were deficit concerns creeping up, that hasn't really moved. You haven't seen forecasts for deficits increase. They've actually been very, very stable if you look across the street about where deficit forecasts are. Yes, they're large, but there hasn't really been any new information that needs to get priced in. So, it's just hard for me to really say that this is a deficit story, and I point back to what I said in your prior question, which is this has really been about global central bank expectations and oil. I would put deficit narrative firmly into the category of a marginally exacerbating factor, which goes along with this idea of crowding out from AI issuance, rise in longer-run growth expectations, you've heard people kind of talk about Fed and Treasury credibility. I would put it in that basket rather than the main drivers, which are global central banks and energy.

As far as like what rate hikes are actually going to do, we got some comments from Barkin last week that I thought really put a good framing around the way that we've been looking at this as well, which is that rate hikes have kind of a physical impact and a metaphysical one. The physical one is really more the direct transmission of policy rates into the macro economy: how does it affect borrowing rates and hurdle rates for projects, etc. Whereas the metaphysical is more the vibes of it: what is it, knowing that the Fed is hiking rates, kind of how is that affecting inflation expectations and people's kind of decision-making process.

I think if you look at that physical piece, that's where I see rate hikes, the transmission has kind of broken down. I think there's very low leverage in the system right now if you look across businesses and consumer balance sheets. Overall, the leverage is relatively low; that kind of lessens the impact. You kind of look at the makeup of our economy right now, one of the major drivers of growth in labor, for example, over the past couple of years has been medical services. We've also seen huge growth in government jobs. Neither of those things are impacted at all by rates, completely rate insensitive. And another factor I would throw on top of that is, this kind of imbalance you have between rate sensitivity where, a lot of cash-rich consumers, a lot of cash-rich businesses have positive interest rate exposure in their asset portfolios. They're earning a lot of interest income, whereas the exposure on the liability side is very, very low. It's fixed, it's been termed out during the pandemic. So, just not a lot of negative interest rate sensitivity in consumers and businesses. And the last I would say is wealth effect. We've got stocks at near all-time highs; I've seen some statistics that around 98–99% of houses in the US have positive equity, and I think that has allowed people to draw on those and kind of continue consumption even as the Fed has started to hike rates. So, I really just don't think rate hikes are going to do a lot through that physical channel, and what the Fed's probably hoping for is more that metaphysical where they are kind of affecting this credibility idea, this keeping long-run inflation expectations from really running away.

Jason Daw:

Okay, great. Thanks, Blake. Very insightful. Let's move across the pond to discuss some interesting developments unfolding there. And Peter, let's start with the current status quo. So, markets are priced in quite a few rate hikes in 2027, but also for the remainder of 2026 in the European and UK market. And we've heard from quite a few central bankers lately. Has that changed your view on the outlook for these central banks?

Peter Schaffrik:

Yeah, thank you, Jason. So, I think we need to differentiate a little bit between sort of the next one, two meetings, where the central banks are starting to guide us a little, and then also for the further-out expiries, which are probably still driven quite a lot by oil, gas movements. And we've heard from Blake that this has been one of the central pillars, of course, for the US pricing, but certainly over here in Europe, I mean, to stay with your analogy of dumpster fire, that's probably where the fire started because we are much more exposed to it. But so, to answer your question directly, so what we've heard from the central banks, particularly from the ECB, and we had Lagarde out and speaking in a hearing in the European Parliament earlier, it's for the first time where she tried to mellow markets' pricing a little. So, she said something like, "at these rates levels, we might see a dampening impact on the economy, for instance." Or we have heard other central bank speakers from the ECB, particularly even the hawkish ones, who said things like, "there is no need to rush into further rate hikes." And when we look at what the market is pricing, let's say for the end of '26, we still have more than one hike priced in, which to my mind seems very unlikely to be delivered from either the Bank of England or the ECB.

So, that's in my mind an area where we can take the central banks' guidance much more at face value, and it's also where we have argued for our clients that there is value. Further out the curve, I'm afraid I think the market will have to live with that very strong reaction function, not necessarily to what the central banks are telling us, but what the market is expecting will come out of the oil and gas situation and the negotiations. I think that's just the reality on the ground at the moment.

Jason Daw:

Okay, Peter. Good comments, well noted. Now, the ECB and Bank of England, they pay a lot of attention to second-round effects. Any indications whether we might see them or not, and what are the next things that you're watching?

Peter Schaffrik:

Yeah, it's an excellent question. Let me just, for the listeners, remind everyone that what both of these central banks are really, really guiding the market over the medium term is that what they're really worried about is that the current inflation that we're seeing that comes out of the energy complex doesn't stay in the energy complex, that it leads to higher wages, and that higher wages then ultimately lead to stronger consumption and higher prices, and it just spreads and percolates. And what they're both saying is that, at the moment, there are no indications whatsoever of those materializing.

Now, I think that is true, but it's also a bit myopic. And what I mean with that is, like, the way wage negotiations work, particularly on the continent of Europe, is that you have very long-dated contracts between employer and employee organizations, unions and employer organizations, that can last up to three years. And they only come due at certain periods in time, and then the demands are being put on the table, and then the negotiations start, and so on and so on. And we had very little of those. And what the ECB in particular does is they look at something that they call the wage tracker, where they look at the current outstanding contracts and where they're going, and then they're saying, they're also citing some surveys which suggest that very little is going to happen. But I think that's just not the reality on the ground. So, when you look at some other forward-looking indicators, such as, for instance, the Indeed wage tracker, that's already pointing upwards. Most recently, we had one of the largest unions in Germany, IG Metall, with about 3.7 million members, putting out, and their negotiations come due in early October, they have put a demand out for 5%. Now, they won't be getting 5%, but even if they get 3.5% or 3 and 3/4%, that's higher than what a) the current indications of the wage tracker that the ECB operates with shows (2.7%), or indeed what the ECB has indicated as being the level that is compatible with the inflation target of 2%, which is 3% wage growth.

So, I think there is a risk that, over time, this is not going to happen quickly, but over time, particularly if unemployment stays quite low, as is the case currently, that we will see some of these second-round effects, which also I think is a reason why the market is pricing reasonably elevated terminal rates. Now, to make a distinction, as the last point I want to probably make on this topic, between the euro area and the UK, I think the probability that we see this in the euro area is higher than in the UK, because in the UK we have slightly elevated unemployment rates. We have a higher pool of unemployed, and therefore just almost by definition or mechanically, we should have less upward pressure on wages. But in the euro area, we're sitting basically at round about 6% unemployment for the last 18 months, which for Europe is close to full employment. So, I think the risk is probably higher than the central banks would let on.

Jason Daw:

Okay, and lastly, Peter, you've just published a note in which you argued that you see upside risks for intra-European spreads. Now, that's a topic, that we've not heard about for many years, and I guess why now?

Peter Schaffrik:

Yeah, so we put that note out last week, and basically the three arguments that I would field is roughly as follows: So, one, we have seen a direction of travel that is towards wider spreads, particularly in the sovereign space already. I mean, that was spearheaded by France, but most lately, we've seen it also spread a little bit wider. And one of the things that Blake mentioned earlier is that we've seen quite a bit of capitulation, particularly in Europe, in crowded positions. I think that's one of those that is crowded, we know that, but that hasn't seen the same amount of capitulation, so I think there's a risk from just the momentum there.

Secondly, however, I also think that there is risk for some of the, let's call it weaker economies. What we see is that the interest rate levels are now fairly high. So, Bund yields are at about 3.60%. But when you look at where the growth comes, let's say in Germany, it comes quite a lot from government spending, and the government is a fairly yield-agnostic issuer. So, I don't think there's any risk that higher yields will necessarily slow the economy dramatically. But when you look at other places, that's not the case. And what we think is quite plausible, that at these yield levels, now when you add the spread that we're currently trading at (10-year OATs, 10-year BTPs are now trading at 4.50% plus), that's certainly higher than the nominal growth that we're seeing in the economy. And as a consequence, I mean for corporate France or for corporate Italy, it's even more iffy. I think there's a non-trivial risk that these yield levels now start to slow the economy, and as a consequence, I think that puts pressure, upward pressure on the spreads if the ECB wouldn't react to it, and they have made no indication that they would so far.

And then the third point that I would field, that also goes back to maybe a question that you asked Blake earlier, is: we do, we might not have that in the US, but we do have some serious questions being asked about the fiscal situation, I mean, predominantly about France at the moment. And the political situation in Europe is such that we have quite a lot of elections coming up. I mean, certainly we've got the French presidential elections at one point in '27, we get the Italian elections, we've got elections in Spain, we've got some regional elections in Germany as well, and we've got some elections in other places. And what we do know is that, going into these elections, it's typically not necessarily a good time to tighten budgets. That's usually not what wins votes. And in particularly the case of, let me say, France, I can also not see that even after the election you get a political constellation that brings about meaningful budgetary change. So, I think we're in an environment which just does not bode well for these spreads. And given that they're still reasonably tight, certainly for everyone else but France, and the positioning is probably still in those, I think the path of least resistance now is probably that we see widening. And indeed, that's something that we haven't heard or talked about for quite some time, but I fear it's something that we'll hear more about as things go along.

Now, Jason, actually, let me maybe turn the tables a bit and ask you a few questions. You've been one of the most hawkish forecasters on the street as far as the Bank of Canada is concerned over the last year or so, and frankly, it seems to be coming close to fruition. So, what are you thinking now for the Bank of Canada, given that the market is practically a coin flip on October and we're pricing five hikes by the end of '27?

Jason Daw:

Yeah, thanks, Peter. So, just to kind of give a bit of a background, we've had a Q1 2027 hike in our forecast since October of last year. So, we did think that the direction of policy rates were going to be higher. We did think that the closing of the output gap was going to necessitate rate hikes at some point, and we've had that, and still have that, penciled in as a base case in the first quarter of 2027. Now, the things that have changed recently, obviously oil prices are quite high. Pricing in Canada has been dragged up by markets globally. But importantly, on September the 2nd, the Bank of Canada did shift quite hawkish. Since then, the communications have been mostly hawkish, maybe a little bit balanced in certain respects, and as you mentioned, the market's around 50/50 for October. Our current view is low-conviction hold. I could be easily convinced into a low-conviction hike. I think there are very good reasons on why they should raise interest rates. So, if you're asking me what should they do, I would say that they probably should raise interest rates in October and November. That would give them some cover from a credibility standpoint, an inflation risk standpoint, a very risk management approach to future inflation. After that, they could maybe pause for a little bit, see how things go. The question of will they, that's more debatable. Clients on either side of the argument in a very low-conviction way, and the communications have been, again, a little bit more mixed very recently. So, it is a very difficult call, but again, we think they should hike. Do we think they will? We're still kind of in that low-conviction hold camp, at least for now.

When you think about it from a bigger picture standpoint, what is the least regret policy choice that they could make? And arguably, raising rates earlier rather than later, that protects against the inflation risks, obviously important for an inflation-targeting central bank. On the other side, if they did raise interest rates and inflation did not manifest itself, they could pause at the midpoint of neutral, or they could even take those back, and that's probably a better outcome than waiting too long. Needless to say, we still think 100 basis points over the cycle is probably the right number from a modal forecast standpoint. Going from the bottom end of neutral to the top end makes a lot of sense if the growth trajectory is looking a little bit better and inflation risks might be elevated due to oil.

Peter Schaffrik:

Okay, so that's for the Bank of Canada. But let me ask you maybe a broader question, and I think it's probably a topic that gets the most attention on the investor side, which is spread to Treasuries. So, Canadian bonds have been outperforming Treasuries quite significantly. And maybe if I just put it to you, is that something to follow or to fade?

 

Jason Daw:

Yeah, good question. Yes, as you mentioned, there's been a lot of outperformance in Canada in the past month. When you look at two-year Canada-US spreads, for example, we're almost back to the lows or the most negative that we've seen over the past three to four years. Further out the curve, yes, Canada's outperformed also, not to the same degree as the front end. And I guess to kind of use Blake's analogy that if there is a dumpster fire in global fixed income and the US is kind of just warming their hands, maybe Canada is just kind of roasting marshmallows because we have had some outperformance versus the US. There's arguments on why this could go further, but I tend to think that when we get big moves like this, when we look at what's priced in (four to five hikes from the BoC, a couple from the Fed), both central banks may disappoint on the back end of where terminal is, but there's maybe more risk of Canada reaching the numbers that we think as far as four hikes this year versus the Fed going more than what Blake is thinking. So, from a fundamental standpoint, we probably get a bit of a reversal, but again, momentum's been strong. Nobody wants to catch a falling knife at this point, and if you are going to look at those cross-market trades, it does need to be further out the curve given the negative carry dynamics in the front end, which makes it quite difficult to hold for a medium-term position.

Peter Schaffrik:

Okay, I like the marshmallow one. So, while your marshmallow is roasting over the dumpster fire, maybe I ask you a last question: So, what keeps you up at night? What do you think is the biggest risk here for global assets?

Jason Daw:

Yeah, like when you look at, I'll take the US market, for example, just because it has the best-delineated recessions, kind of crises versus some other markets. But, what we've seen kind of historically is higher interest rates, rate hikes, or higher interest rates across the curve, those alone have never really been sufficient to tilt the balance into a slow-growth environment, recession, or big disturbances in risk assets or financial markets in general. What's typically needed to happen is that higher interest rates are accompanied by something else. And that something else right now is oil, and we've had past experiences of this over history. That can be quite a negative cocktail for markets kind of in general. And what you tend to see in these situations, that something that's benign or there's a small crack, once you get these compounding effects of interest rates plus exogenous shocks, these cracks tend to get a little bit bigger, and things that seemed like non-events could become problems. So, we haven't seen that yet. There's worries out there. Private credit's been one for quite some time; AI valuations have been one for quite some time. So, we need some other catalyst maybe to come along, but it feels like we're in a more fragile environment now than maybe we've been over the past two to three years.

Peter Schaffrik:

Yeah, I would certainly concur, and I'd go back to what I said earlier and throw one of the cracks that seems to be appearing is in the EGB spreads. So, let's see where this is going. Well, frankly, I think this probably brings us to the end of this episode. So, thank you very much, everyone, for joining this episode of Macro Minutes. The situation in fixed income markets is tricky, but it's definitely worth monitoring, not least for fixed income investors, but also for credit and equity folks. Please do reach out to your RBC sales representative if you have any questions, or indeed to us directly if you have any questions for us. With that, that concludes the episode, and thank you for joining.

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