Hello, and welcome to Macro Minutes. During each episode, we'll be joined by RBC capital markets experts to provide high conviction insights on the latest developments in financial markets and the global economy. Please listen to the end of this recording for important disclosures.
Megum Muhic:
Hello everyone, and welcome back to our Macro Minutes podcast. This one is titled Wake Up Call, and we're taking a closer look at European bond markets in this episode, and that's obviously following the substantial spread widening that we've seen. My name is Megan Megum Muhic and I'm the UK rate strategist at RBC, and I'll be hosting the episode today. We're recording the podcast on the 6th of October, 2026. So maybe the most concerning aspects of the recent move is that it appears to be morphing into a broader issue rather than just a French idiosyncratic problem. And some sessions, certainly last week, felt pretty much like a crisis. So hence joining me today, I have no two people better to speak on the topic. So I have my colleagues, George Moran, who is our European economist, and I have Peter Schaffrick, who's our chief European macro strategist.
Maybe the best place to start then is the situation in France, given it looks like that OATs have been the first mover and is still very much getting most of the media attention. So George, I know you've been writing a lot about the French budget and fiscal situation recently, so perhaps you can share your thoughts on the topic.
George Moran:
Yeah, thanks, Megum. I think I'll start by taking a little bit of a step back and thinking about why did France get into this situation in the first place. Now, France is quite unusual in that it has a very large state. So government spending is 57% of GDP in France, which is one of the highest in the world among major economies, amongst the Euro area countries. It is certainly the highest, but France has had a big state for a long time, so that doesn't really tell us why the budget deficit issue is so profound at the moment. Really, if you want to trace back the origins of this issue, we have to go back to 2018 when there was reform to social security payments under Emmanuel Macron, which made a big cut to social security revenues, and that gap's never been filled. During COVID, there was a lot of noise in the budget numbers, but now that that has all sort of settled down from the system, we're left with quite a persistent gap, which hasn't been filled by cut in government spending.
We also face another problem at the moment in France, which is a rise in interest costs. Clearly since COVID in the last five years, there's been a big increase in government bond deals and France has been no exception, and that is slowly starting to translate into higher government expenditure and interest. And France has a fairly long weighted average intuitive its debt. It's about nine years, so it's fairly slow for this to translate into the government finances, but it does mean that over the next couple of years, they're going to feel quite a persistent impact, a negative impact on their budget deficit from this. So France is facing a bit of a tricky situation. In order to get their deficit down... The deficit at the moment stands at 5.4% in 2026. To get it down to the European Commission's target, they're going to have to either raise taxes or cut spending, neither of which are going to be particularly popular at the moment.
Megum Muhic:
Yeah, okay. If I could just follow up on that. So it's interesting, you laid out the problem that they face and potentially what they need to do. I guess the next question is if there's any political hurdles that they need to get through in order to achieve those things they need to do. And I guess is there anything specifically that investors need to be watching from here?
George Moran:
Right, that's probably the key question at the moment because over the next few weeks there's, as you say, a lot of hurdles for this budget to actually be passed. We had a draft budget put forward by the finance minister last week at time of according, but that's not been confirmed by parliament. And parliament is extremely split at the moment. The National Assembly has basically three factions, the left, the center, the right, all who have pretty strong views on what needs to go into the budget and none of which apart from the centrist parties really want to propose big spending cuts or tax rises. So the political path over the next couple of weeks looks pretty difficult to work out. The budget that they put forward for 2027 has pretty strong spending cuts in it. The public sector pay is freezed in nominal terms across most departments over the next year.
There's due to be 2000 cuts to administrative jobs. There's also going to be an above inflation increase in pension. So some pretty harsh measures in this budget and it's pretty hard to see that being agreed by the National Assembly pretty quickly. So the next couple of weeks, I think we're going to have quite a lot of uncertainty about what a form this budget is eventually going to take. It's also not clear to me that the budget concerns are massively cutting through to the public consciousness. In France, the main mechanism for which households probably feel the budget strain is through mortgage rates and not a lot of households have mortgages in France. Only about 30% of households have mortgages. And if you get a mortgage in France, generally, you fix it for the whole term of your mortgage, which means most people have 15 to 30 year fixed mortgages.
So the amount of households that are actually going to be rolling over their mortgages in the next year is very limited. So the direct impact of maybe higher OAT bond spreads on households is not that significant. So it feels to me like the pain of the budget, the cuts are going to be felt by way more people than the pain of the budget deficit, which means again, from a political perspective, it's a little bit challenging to see where the strong will to really cut the deficit is going to come from. Now, probably looking at the arithmetic, we think that the main way in which a budget can get passed is with the support of the right-wing national rally party led by Marine Le Pen. Now they have expressed some openness to supporting a budget to avoid spooking the markets. And Marine Le Pen has proposed her own budget, which would get the deficit down to 3% by 2032 and her own golden rule of public finances.
So there certainly does seem to be some awareness from that side that passing a budget is important to calm the markets. Although at the moment, it's pretty easy to talk that rhetoric. It'll be harder to actually deliver on that, especially if the national rally end up having to support policies like public sector cuts and particularly policies that might hurt pensioners, which is a key support base for them. So it seems like maybe on paper there's a route for the national rally to support a budget, but there's, as you say, a lot of political hurdles to overcome and it's certainly not clear that we will get this budget or a budget that achieves considerable fiscal consolidation through by the end of the year.
Megum Muhic:
I mean, that's an interesting way to think about it. But as mentioned in intro as well, this does appear to be morphing into a broader issue than just France. We have seen, particularly last week, Italian, Belgium, and even Spanish spreads joining in on the widening too. I know Peter, just two weeks ago, you made a great call. You warned that the risks of spread widening could broaden out. Maybe you can give us your insights in how you came to this conclusion and where you think we are going from here.
Peter Schaffrick:
Yeah, thank you, Megum. So first of all, if I pick up on where George left off, obviously there is a broader problem that sits in France in particular in the political issue and in the French issue, and that won't go away. And that, in itself, is obviously concerning. However, I would field two arguments or we fielded two additional arguments that apply more broadly. One is macro and one is very market specific. So the macro one has something to do with the level of interest rates relative to the level of growth rates. So when you look at the growth rates in particularly France or also in a place like Italy, they have obviously been relatively mediocre to say the least. And that is true not only in real terms as we usually observe them, but also in nominal terms. Normal growth rates in Italy and in France were around about 2% for the last couple of quarters on a year-on-year basis.
And that is obviously much, much lower than the interest rates that these countries are currently paying on the sovereign debt, let alone any corporate debt. And that of course implies to me that from a sheer financing perspective, we've seen a huge amount of financial tightening that ultimately is going to weigh on growth even further or put differently. The interest rate level is way too restrictive for the ability of these economies to grow. And as George was just pointing out, we'll probably on top of that, we'll get some kind of a fiscal contraction in contrast to let's say Germany, which has a fiscal expansion to boost the economy. So that's problem number one, and that's not going to go away anytime soon either. And then number two is more of a market intrinsic one. One of the hallmarks of this year has been that throughout the volatility that was sparked by the energy crisis, we have seen quite a lot of consensus positions being stood out.
That was true for the short end of the yield curve, that was true for steepening positions. And I think being in some kind of a carry trade where you have some kind of a spread product over let's say either the swap curve or the European benchmark, the bond curve, has been a consensus trade as well. And so therefore, I think the risk is if we see some kind of a spread widening that's moving from France into some of the other countries, that is very quick to deliver a acceleration that comes from the market positioning in itself now. And I think that's what we've seen last week. Now arguably now it seems to be coming back a little and that is the typical toing and froing of the market. However, I would argue that if you put these two arguments together, it's very unlikely in my mind that we get back very quickly into a situation where the spread tightening trade that was prominent can reinstate itself. I think the Pandora's box has been opened and I think the risk in my mind is that we get more of these episodes as we've just witnessed.
Megum Muhic:
Well, I guess this could be a theme for quite some time then. Maybe just going back to you, George, and the situation in France, I know you highlighted some political hurdles, but if we just assume for the time being that this budget for 2027 does go through, in your view, does this solve the issue and does it put France on the path to debt sustainability?
George Moran:
Yeah, so I think this is a super important issue and a point that we've been making with our clients, which is that when you're pricing government bonds and solving debt sustainability, it's not just important what's deficit going to be in the next year, but you have to assess what's the future path for growth, interest rates, the primary deficit for many years to come. And based on our calculations and our assessments of the French budgetary numbers, it's not going to be easy to put France on a path of debt sustainability, even if you manage to get the 2027 budget passed. The government has reiterated its commitment to reach the 3% budget deficit target set by the European Commission. The National Rally Party, as I mentioned, have suggested that they would meet that by 2032. Current government hopes to meet it a bit earlier than that. We've run the numbers and partly because of the interest burden, which is embedded in the yield curve and in the rollover risk of the French government bonds, we're already going to see quite a big increase in interest rate expenditure from the government.
And if we crunch the numbers based on what the government needs to do to get a 3% budget deficit in, say, five years time in the future, they're going to need to make continual real term cuts in spending, probably going to have to freeze nominal spending in some terms and do that for multiple years, year-on-year. And that would be... If we have that for the next four years, that would be the most consecutive years of cuts in spending as a percentage of GDP in France's history going back to World War II. So it would be an unprecedented period length of austerity for France. And we just think that is politically very challenging. We know that it's already going to be a challenge to get the budget through this year. To get that through year after year looks tricky. And if we look at, say, new national assembly elections in 2027, maybe that could provide some relief if we get, say, a majority government for the centrists or with the national rally.
But based on the current polling, it doesn't look like there's going to be any sort of political consensus anytime soon in the national assembly. Marine Le Pen has put forward, as I say, a plan to get the budget deficit now to 2032, but a lot of the assumptions which underpin that seem pretty fragile. So she's discussed ideas like cutting back public spending, which is what they're already planning to do, reducing tax fraud, which is always something that's pretty hard for governments to achieve. It's easy to say you're going to do, much harder to deliver on. And also plans like cutting France's EU contributions, which seem pretty difficult to do. I mean, if France is going to be able to cut its EU contribution, surely every other country is going to reduce their contributions too. So I think that's a little bit of a non-starter. So it seems like even some of the proposals that appear on paper to be narrowing the deficit to 3% are dodging some of the hard questions that France would actually have to face in order to do that.
So long story short, I think even if you get this 2027 budget passed in this current form, which we think is pretty unlikely, that does not mean the end for France. And they're going to continue to face tough questions around their deficit, and that's probably going to put pressure on their bond deals for the foreseeable future.
Megum Muhic:
Well, I guess then a natural follow-on question then from here is what can the ECB do about it? I know we fielded a lot of questions from clients recently about the TPI program. Maybe Peter, you can share your thoughts on this.
Peter Schaffrick:
Yeah, actually I'll leave the TPI for now and you'll see in a second why. I mean, it seems naturally to me that in an environment that we're in now, the ECB is always sort of looked towards and say, "Okay, can you come to the rescue?" I mean, maybe the starting point would be... The best remedy here would be to boost growth domestically, but obviously, that seems difficult. So I mean, what can the ECB do? I mean, the first thing, the first line of defense that I see is when you take a step back, obviously the ECB has been reasonably hawkish, we discussed this in previous episodes on the back of the energy crisis, but one of the things that they obviously can do is guide the market that the rate hiking process might not be as aggressive at what the market is currently pricing. And actually, I think they've started to do that already.
So specifically when you look at the two last public appearances of Lagarde and the Chief Economist Lane, both have started to stress that the financial tightening in the market that we're seeing might be doing some of the heavy lifting for the ECB. And the market has reacted to this by pricing out some of the rate hikes that were previously priced. So I think that's obviously one of the first line of defenses that can quite easily be achieved, I would argue. And I think there's certainly a macro argument to this. If spreads are wider, obviously that is a financial tightening as I was arguing earlier, and therefore the ECB indeed doesn't need to deliver the same amount of tightening. So that's number one. Number two, and I think this is also gathering a bit of attention, there was a FT operated by a former ECB member, Bini Smaghi, earlier this week, where he argued that the ECB's QT program should be reassessed.
Now, the ECB's long-term plan obviously is to reduce the bond holdings quite significantly. In the absence of any complication, they would probably run this for years to come, but certainly that is one of the levers that they could pull where they maybe go at a slower pace or maybe suspend it for the time being because that obviously puts additional supply into the market by them not reinvesting at the moment. So that would be, in my mind, the second line of defense. Now the third line of defense, that could be indeed the TPI. And for those listeners who are not familiar with the program is a program that has so far been unused, but that was announced back in '22, I believe it was. But we have to think about that with certain conditions. And basically the program is designed for a very unorderly market that would essentially jeopardize the ECB's ability to steer monetary policy for the Euro area as a whole.
And I think we're very, very far away from that. I mean, that is a program that is really designed for extreme situations and we're surely nowhere near that. I mean, if we look beyond France, I mean, you mentioned in an earlier question, like it was even mixed in... That spread widening was even seen in places like Spain. But when you look at the absolute spread levels, for instance, of Spain at 60, 65 basis points over [inaudible 00:18:08], surely in the historical comparison is still very low. So I think we would need to see a much more extreme scenario than what we're currently seeing. So long story short, I think the ECB has some levers to pull, some are a little bit more ordinary than others, and I think they would really start slowly with more normal tools rather than going to these extreme measures.
Megum Muhic:
Yeah. Okay. I mean, that's super interesting, given... Like I said, we fielded so many questions from clients specifically on the TPI program, but as you mentioned, there are probably tools that can be used before then. Maybe thinking a bit broader now, is there anything that can be done fiscally here? I know in situations like this, calls for pan-European funding are never far from the surface.
Peter Schaffrick:
Yeah, I think there's another one. I mean, again, if I take a step back, I mean, if the situation gets worse, I can certainly see that it becomes a pan-European issue. And in fact, even before the situation that we just described unfolded, there were already talks for European programs. When we think back to the pandemic era, or rather the aftermath of it, we had the NGEU that is running out at the end of this year. And one of the calls for a follow-on program I think would only get stronger. And I can see an environment where once the NGEU program was obviously designed to get Europe growing again after the pandemic and the funds were predominantly skewed towards Southern Europe, which suffered more during the pandemic than Northern Europe, I can see an environment now, for instance, where the EU would say, "Well, we need to do something for the military in particular. We feel threatened. The military budgets need to increase anyway. There's a demand from the Americans. There's the realities on the ground and the situation we're facing with Russia and all of that."
And I could see a program that would be designed on a pan-European basis that then, let's say, goes more towards military spending. And when you look at where the big military industries are in Europe, they're obviously located more in places like France, Germany, parts of Italy. So that would then benefit France as well. So I can see something like that, but again, we also have to keep in mind the European machinery is working rather slowly and it sometimes takes a real crisis to get them into gear. So I wouldn't hold my breath that something like this is going to be rolled out quickly, but it's certainly something that I can see.
Megum Muhic:
Okay. Thank you, Peter. Maybe George, you can touch on Spain. I know you spoke a lot about France, but we just had an announcement this week that Spain will hold elections at the end of November. This came as quite of a surprise of an announcement. I was just interested to hear your views on... Do you see similar political risks here as you do in France, for example?
George Moran:
Yeah, so it's election season at the moment in Europe. We knew we were going to have elections coming up in Spain at some point before the end of next year. We also have Italian and French elections next year, so a lot on the political calendar to be looking out for, but this one in Spain came a little bit earlier than we expected, and we're now going to have an election on the 29th of November in Spain after a crisis related to housing escalated politically in Spain. It seems pretty likely from the current polling that the incumbent center left party is likely to lose quite a lot of support. They've faced quite a few scandals since the last election in 2023. And more broadly across Europe, we've seen moves to the right. We've seen that in Germany, we've seen that in France, also in Italy and in the UK as well.
So it seems that that trend is, to some extent, going to materialize in this election. And we're probably going to have a center right party leading a coalition, that's the PP, with maybe the more right-wing party, Vox. It's possible PP might get a majority, but it seems most likely that there's going to be a coalition for the time being. Why could this be important for markets? Well, I don't think it's going to have perhaps as much as an impact as what might be going on in France, but I think it could still be important because it could determine some of the quite fundamental drivers of growth in Spain at the moment. If we deconstruct the drivers of Spanish growth in recent years, a large part of that comes from immigration. They've had surging immigration since COVID, largely from South America, also a decent amount from North Africa, and that has been fueling a quite big increase in potential supply.
There has been some productivity growth as well, so it's not purely an immigration story, but about 3/4 of the potential growth rate at the moment is coming from immigration. And I think it's quite clear that there's political will to change that. There's been quite a big scandal about immigration from North Africa in the last couple of months, and naturally the PP and the Vox Party are more anti-immigration, and that all ties into this housing issue as well. Spanish house construction has been very depressed in recent years and has not been able to meet the increase in the supply of labor. So I think this is something that's going to be tightened down on. And as I say, that's been a very important driver of growth. And if that pillar of growth disappears, then that could also make markets suddenly start questioning the fragility of the Spanish debt situation.
Spain has been on a positive fiscal trajectory. They've met the 3% fiscal deficit target the European commission sets already, but that has been driven in large part by that strong growth narrative. And if that starts to fade, then increasingly there may be a tension again on high yields, slowing growth rates, and existing high levels of debt. Now, Spain seems pretty low down the chain of concerns at the moment in the Euro area and the European Union, which is why their spreads haven't been widening as much as elsewhere. But I still think it's something that could be important to watch. I don't also think that the PP and Vox would be a disaster for government finances by any means. They are naturally fairly fiscally conservative, like Marine Le Pen. They want to cut government spending, they want to reduce benefits that immigrants receive. So to some degree they are fiscally conservative, but the fact that there may be a shift in that driver of Spanish growth, I think would be something particularly interesting to watch, particularly if the market starts to pick up on that as an important theme.
Megum Muhic:
So I guess yeah, it hasn't really been in the limelight so far, but one to keep an eye on then. Maybe finally, Peter, in FX markets, we've seen quite a pronounced weakening in the Euro, and this really started since we've seen this spread widening move starting in Europe. Do you see this as a bigger revaluation or is this a move to be faded?
Peter Schaffrick:
Yeah, I'm going to dodge your question a little, but one of the things I would say is, and I was alluding to it earlier when I was making the comparison between interest rates and growth levels, I think more broadly, the market has started to pay more attention to those markets and currency areas and countries that can bear higher interest rates, strong growth countries like the US or like Australia, for instance, and those that will find it more difficult. And I think that's one of the reasons why we, A, see the spread widening, but secondly, also why we've recently seen the Euro depreciation. However, as I said, I'm going to dodge your question a little because I do know... And it's maybe a little teaser here, I do know that we will record a special FX version of Macro Minutes in the next edition. So I don't want to steal my colleagues' thunder, but maybe that's a bit of a cliffhanger here.
Megum Muhic:
Okay. I guess that is a pretty good cliffhanger to wrap up this episode. I'd just like to thank you, George and Peter, for sharing your insights. It sounds like we've got a very interesting few weeks ahead of us, and I just want to thank you all for listening in. And as you just heard from Peter, make sure to tune in our next episode where the focus will be more on FX markets.
This content is based on information available at the time it was recorded and is for informational purposes only. It is not an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation, and no recommendations are implied. It is outside the scope of this communication to consider whether it is suitable for you and your financial objectives.