Data centers become the new battleground in Iran war

Iranian attacks on Gulf tech infrastructure expose vulnerabilities in U.S.-backed AI investments, while Houthi entry compounds energy market risks.

By Helima Croft
Published | 4 min read

Key points

  • Five confirmed attacks on Gulf data centers since the war began signal a strategic shift toward targeting AI infrastructure, undermining confidence in the region's $2 trillion in planned U.S.-backed tech investments.
  • Iran's IRGC published a list of 29 tech targets, signaling direct threats to compute infrastructure vital to U.S. geopolitical and energy interests.
  • Houthi Red Sea operations threaten material cuts to oil flows, with Brent up 30% since July 1. Oil prices could breach $128/bbl (2022 highs) or test $146/bbl (2008 peak) in worst-case regional conflict scenarios.
  • European natural gas storage at 54% full versus 64% in 2022 during the prior crisis. Backwardated TTF prices and LNG transit security concerns reduce storage incentives ahead of a potentially volatile winter.

Computing power becomes a weapon in regional conflict

Data centers have emerged as an unexpected but strategically critical vulnerability in the Iran conflict. Since the war began, five confirmed attacks on data centers in the Gulf have occurred. These strikes target not only the region's next innovation and diversification frontier but also represent a vital attack vector on America's commercial, political, and defense interests.

In the conflict's early phase, Iran struck two AWS data centers in the UAE and one in Bahrain, disrupting cloud services regionally. The U.S. responded with a strike on an Iranian data center, prompting the IRGC to publish a list of 29 tech targets across the region, including sites from AWS, Microsoft, Google, NVIDIA, Palantir, and Oracle. These are not peripheral assets — they represent the backbone of the region's AI infrastructure and critical enablers of U.S. strategic interests in the Gulf.

The targeting of data centers reflects a deliberate strategy to inflict outsized pain on the United States. GCC countries have pledged over $2 trillion in AI-related investments with the U.S., contingent on divesting from Chinese technology platforms to access U.S. chips. This Compute Diplomacy has aligned the region with the U.S., but in doing so, it has exposed their AI assets to Iranian attacks that can inflict outsized damage on American interests.

The infrastructure supporting these investments — data centers housing cloud services, AI computing, and defense systems — has become a proxy battleground for broader U.S.-Iran competition. On their surface, these attacks and broader threats undermine confidence in what stands to be a critical region for AI innovation and investment. Yet they also illuminate the role these companies play in warfare and diplomacy, and the lengths the U.S. will pursue to defend them.

While the immediate impact is on tech services, the broader implication is more systemic. These defense and technology blocs deepen interdependence, tying each country's success to another and creating a new dimension for the U.S. in the ongoing conflict. For energy market participants, this creates a new layer of geopolitical risk. Energy companies relying on cloud services for operations management, autonomous systems, and data analytics now face the same infrastructure threats as defense contractors. The interconnectedness of modern energy infrastructure with cloud computing and AI systems means that attacks on data centers pose direct risks to oil production, refining operations, and LNG exports.

"As AI becomes more pervasive in warfare, the infrastructure enabling intelligence will increasingly come under threat."

Helima Croft, Head of Global Commodity Strategy and MENA Research, RBC Capital Markets

The escalation threatens the strategic alignment underpinning regional stability. By targeting data centers, Iran is directly challenging the technological and defense partnerships that condition GCC access to advanced U.S. capabilities. The success or failure of these tech assets in surviving the conflict will shape whether allied nations maintain confidence in U.S. protection and continue their commitment to the Compute Diplomacy framework.

Houthis expand the conflict into critical shipping lanes

The conflict has entered an exceptionally dangerous phase with the Houthis' entry into the Red Sea. While Brent prices have risen more than 30% since July 1, they remain a lagging indicator of escalating pressures in the region. Given current dynamics, oil prices could breach the 2022 Russia/Ukraine peak of $128/bbl or even test the 2008 high of $146/bbl, particularly in worst-case scenarios involving full regional conflict.

With confirmed targeting of Saudi tankers in the Red Sea, sustained Houthi operations would materially reduce total Red Sea oil flows and challenge the prevailing market sentiment that "the market always finds a workaround."

Routing alternatives come with significant costs and delays. While Saudi cargos could theoretically route through the Suez Canal instead of the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, fully-laden VLCCs cannot transit the Suez due to depth constraints. These vessels would need to discharge roughly half their cargo (~1 mb) onto the Sumed pipeline or employ Suezmax tonnage for shuttle operations. Both options significantly increase costs and extend Asia transit times from approximately 44 days to around 54 days. The practical effect is a meaningful reduction in transport efficiency and a corresponding increase in delivered costs for Asian buyers, creating upward pressure on global oil prices regardless of physical supply constraints.

Notably, the Houthis had resisted entering the conflict until the Saudi strike on Sanaa Airport in response to an Iranian airliner's arrival, suggesting their actions are driven by internal calculations rather than phone calls from Tehran. This independence makes their behavior less predictable and potentially more escalatory than a coordinated Iranian proxy strategy might suggest, introducing a new risk premium to Red Sea shipping and energy markets.

Winter storage levels signal vulnerability across European energy markets

European leaders are sounding the alarm as natural gas storage falls to crisis levels ahead of winter. European natural gas storage stands at 54% full compared to 64% at this time in 2022 during the prior energy crisis, with current injection rates below 10-year seasonal averages. The key variable will be when and how quickly Qatari LNG exports resume to add slack to the market. However, recent escalation, an LNG tanker hit, and dangerous strait conditions have shifted sentiment markedly, with prompt prices surging above 60 EUR/MWH and TTF forward prices backwardated, a condition reducing commercial storage incentive precisely when supply security would benefit from building reserves. These dynamics present the possibility of a volatile, constrained winter with minimal buffer in global LNG markets, compounded by security concerns over LNG transits and the potential for data center attacks to disrupt energy logistics coordination.

Helima Croft authored "Iran Flashpoints: Water Wars," published on July 22, 2026. For more information on the full report, please contact your RBC representative.

Our expert

Helima Croft
Helima Croft
Head of Global Commodity Strategy and MENA Research, RBC Capital Markets

 

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